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Abstract— Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have gained
much attention in recent years for both commercial and
military applications. The progress in this field has gained much
popularity and the research has encompassed various fields
of scientific domain. Cyber securing a UAV communication
has been one of the active research field since the attack on
Predator UAV video stream hijacking in 2009. Since UAVs rely
heavily on on-board autopilot to function, it is important to
develop an autopilot system that is robust to possible cyber
attacks. In this work, we present a biometric system to encrypt
the UAV communication by generating a key which is derived
from Beta component of the EEG signal of a user. We have
developed a safety mechanism that would be activated in
case the communication of the UAV from the ground control
station gets attacked. This system has been validated on a
commercial UAV under malicious attack conditions during
which we implement a procedure where the UAV return safely
to a ‘home’ position.
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in civilian
airspace has been growing, ranging from public safety appli-
cations, to commercial use, to personal use by hobbyists. It
could be well explained by the increasing affordability of the
technology by hobbyists and enthusiasts, which allows them
for the creation of innovative applications for the UAV’s. This
have subsequently led to the occurrence of several severe
incidents of different type of attacks on both military and
civil UAVs. Several security issues have been demonstrated
in recent investigations of cheap consumer UAVs, revealing
these systems to be vulnerable to attack.
Commercial activities such as Google’s “Project
Wing” [18], which has successfully tested its drones for
food delivery, and Amazon’s “Prime Air” service [2], which
aims to provide same-day package delivery, would place
several drones in commercial airspace, near population
centers. This increases with the number of UAVs in civilian
airspace and their proximity to people. This increases the
potential for, and interest in, potential cyberattacks on those
UAVs. These potential threats need to be addressed in order
to ensure that a UAV completes its mission and is not used
for a malicious purpose.
In this work, we propose a technique which secures the
UAV communication to the ground control station using
an encryption key generated using features of a person’s
electroencephalogram (EEG) signal. UAVs in modern times
communicate with each other using small mobile modules
called XBee. XBee’s provides the functionality of securing
the communication using AES encryption standard. We gen-
erate an AES encryption key derived from the an EEG signal.
We have developed a demonstration safety mechanism which
becomes activated in case there is a detection of potential
attack from a third party. This secures UAV communication
using a biometric signal. This entire system is validated on
a commercially available UAV.
We performed the testing on a UAV, where we encrypt its
communication to the ground control station by configuring
the XBee’s AES encryption key using an EEG biometric
key. After configuring the Xbees, we create a simple attack
scenario hack, in which the third party or attacker is aware
of the key and tries to attack the communication from the
UAV to the ground control station. We test our proposed
safety solution that enables the UAV to detect that an attack
has been attempted and should return back to the ‘home’
station.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been several known incidents where civilian
and military robots have been remotely compromised for the
purposes of taking control of the UAV or making it crash-
land. The first most popular known attack on a UAV occurred
in 2009, where the Iraqi militants used “SkyGabber” software
to intercept live video feeds from an unsecured communica-
tion link used by a Predator Drone [8]. In October 2011, a
key-logging malware was found in the Predator and Reaper
ground control stations, likely installed using a removable
hard drive. The virus got spreaded to both classified and
unclassified computers [19].
A more troubling incident that grabbed international at-
tention was the claimed theft of a Sentinel RQ-170 UAV by
Iranian forces in December 2012. Hostile agents were able
to compromise the control system of the craft and remotely
land the UAV, obtaining sensitive data including mission and
maintenance data. There are competing theories regarding
how the RQ-170 Sentinel may have been lost. The simplest
theory is that the loss of the UAV was a result of a technical
malfunction, causing the UAV to mistakenly land in Iranian
territory [9].
However, a more nefarious possibility is that through a
vulnerability in a sensor system, the UAV’s GPS could have
been intentionally fooled into landing to a location where
a hostile agent intended. This type of attack is generally
referred to as a “GPS-Spoofing” attack [7], [9]. An example
of this type of attack was demonstrated by a University of
Texas at Austin research team, partnered with the Department
of Homeland Security to demonstrate the ability to hijack a
military UAV. Using relatively inexpensive equipment, these
researchers were able to spoof the global position system
(GPS) and take complete control of the UAV [20] [1].
Interesting research regarding control security for UAVs is
being pursued. A team from the University of Virginia (UVA)
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and the Georgia Tech Research Institute, operating with
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), conducted flight
tests that evaluated a new class of cyber security solutions
on a UAV performing a video surveillance mission. Their
goal was to protect computer-controlled remote systems
from cyber attacks. It included a new cybersecurity layer
called as System-Aware which represents a class of solutions
that depends on detailed knowledge of the design of the
system being protected. This layer of security provides both
complement network and perimeter security solutions and
protects against supply chain and insider attacks that may be
embedded within a system [10].
Most UAV systems are moving their infrastructure towards
more network-centric command and control, where all of
the components are interconnected through sophisticated
mesh networks [5]. This enables fast communication and
constant environmental and asset awareness, but introduces
security drawbacks. Some military UAV systems, such as
the Global Hawk, already employ this type of infrastruc-
ture. Public safety and disaster management UAVs are also
moving to a similar network architecture for planning and
communication [12]. When the components of the system
are interconnected through such a network, a compromise
of one component can cause a propagation of failures or
malicious behavior can occur throughout the whole system.
Other research from UVA and the MITRE Corporation at
Creech Air Force Base in Nevada designed and conducted
a set of tabletop simulation-based experiments with active
military UAV pilots. The purpose of these simulations was
to determine the best course of action if a cyberattack was
detected and if autonomous behavior could provide a secure
and safe solution to a potential attack. The pilots presumed
that a System-Aware solution could automatically detect
cyber attacks. The pilots were asked to suggest how to
control the UAV to restore normal operations. Possibilities
included navigating to an earlier waypoint or switching from
GPS-based navigation to less accurate, but more trusted,
inertial navigation [10].
An interesting perspective which attempts to solve the
cyber-security aspect of UAVs considers the whole scenario
of vendor and an attacker as a zero-sum network interdiction
game. It is represented as a game where the vendor, also
assumed an evader, seeks to choose the optimal path strategy
for its UAV, from a source location to a destination location,
to evade attacks along the way and minimize its expected
delivery time. On the other hand, the attacker or interdictor,
aims at choosing the optimal attack locations along the paths
traversed by the UAV to interdict the UAV, causing cyber
or physical damage, with the goal of maximizing the travel
time. Later on it is shown that this network interdiction
game is equivalent to a zero-sum matrix game whose Nash
equilibrium (NE) can be derived by solving two linear
programming (LP) problems. Solving the LP’s would give
the expected delivery time under different conditions [3].
One potential solution is to use biometric information to
secure communication between a UAV and its command and
control station. This would allow the UAV to verify that its
stated operator is issuing the commands to the UAV. To the
best of our knowledge, biometric UAV authentication has
been limited to facial recognition alone. Facial authentication
is problematic since it can be easily deceived by an attacker
if they have a picture of the actual operator [4]. In this way, a
more secure biometric feature is needed. We propose to use
EEG signal characteristics to secure communication between
an operator and a UAV.
III. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH A UAV
Communication between a ground station and a civilian
UAV is typically done through Zigbee or XBee. ZigBee
is based on the international standard 802.15.4. To extend
the transmission range, ZigBee is adding mesh networking
functionality on top of the 802.15.4 standard, in which
single messages are forwarded through the network to its
destination node. Depending on the frequency band used,
transmission rates can vary. Typically it ranges from 20kbit/s
to 250kbit/s [6].
Zigbee uses IEEE 802.15.4 protocol as its MAC layer.
IEEE 802.15.4 sets the encryption algorithm to use when
cyphering the data to transmit. However, the standard does
not specify how the keys have to be managed or what
kind of authentication policies have to be applied. These
issues are treated in the upper layers which are managed by
ZigBee. The encryption algorithm used is AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) with a 128b key length (16 Bytes). The
AES algorithm is not only used to encrypt the information
but also validates the data which is sent [17]. This Data
Integrity is achieved using a Message Integrity Code (MIC)
also named as Message Authentication Code (MAC) which
is added to the message. So, a message is received from a
non-trusted node we will see that the MAC generated for the
sent message does not correspond to the one what would be
generated using the message with the current secret Key, so
we can discard this message. The MAC can have different
sizes: 32, 64, 128 bits, however it is always created using
the 128b AES algorithm. The MAC’s size is just the bit
length which is attached to each frame. Data security is
accomplished by encrypting the data payload field with the
128b Key. ZigBee implements two extra security layers on
top of the 802.15.4 layer: Network and Application security
layers. All three security policies rely on the AES 128b
encryption algorithm. There are three kinds of keys:
Master key: These are pre-installed in each node. Their
function is to keep confidential the Link Keys exchange
between two nodes in the Key Establishment Procedure
(SKKE) [22].
Link Keys: These are unique between each pair of nodes.
These keys are managed by the Application level. They are
used to encrypt all the information between each two devices,
for this reason more memory resources are needed in each
device [22].
Network Keys: These are a unique 128b key shared among
all the devices in the network. It is generated by the Trust
Center and regenerated at different intervals. Each node has
to get the Network Key in order to join the network. Once
Fig. 1. Basic block diagram of the system overview.
the trust center decides to change the Network Key, the new
one is spread through the network using the old Network Key
(see image above about “ZigBee Residential Mode”). Once
this new key is updated in a device, its Frame Counter (see in
the previous sections) is initialized to zero. This Trust Center
is normally the Coordinator, however it can be a dedicated
device. It has to authenticate and validate each device which
attempts to join the network.
IV. APPROACH
The EEG signal is unique; to a person and values overtime.
It is possible to generate a key unique to a particular user.
Also, based on different user activity and different state
of mind, the EEG signal of even a same person will be
different. Moreover, this unique signal changes every few
hours at different state of mind, which means that it cannot
be permanently “stolen.” This unique key can be used for
encrypting AES data like what is used in Zigbee communi-
cation. We have developed a robust method for utilizing brain
EEG signal characteristics to generate the cryptographic key
for AES data encryption and decryption. In this section, we
describe our method for securing a UAV communication
using this EEG signal. We configure the AES encryption
key of the XBee of both the UAV and the ground control
station with the Key generated from the above procedure. We
also implement a safety backtrack path procedure in case the
communication is attacked.
A. EEG Signal Properties
We obtain a user’s EEG signal recorded using the Mind-
wave EEG sensor [21]. This device safely measures and
outputs the EEG power spectra (alpha waves, beta waves,
etc), NeuroSky eSense meters (attention and meditation), and
eye blinks. The device consists of a headset, an ear-clip, and
a sensor arm. The headsets reference and ground electrodes
are on the ear clip and the EEG electrode is on the sensor
arm, resting on the forehead above the eye (see Figure 1). It
operates using battery power.
We chose to use Beta waves from the EEG signal as the
basis for our analysis. Beta waves are in the frequency range
of 12 and 30 Hz, but are often divided into β1 (low Beta)
and β2 (high Beta) to get a more specific range. The waves
are small and fast, associated with focused concentration and
best defined in central and frontal areas. There is an increase
of β activity when a person concentrates on tasks such as
resisting or suppressing movement or solving a math task.
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Fig. 2. Beta component of EEG waveform of 4 different people. The
patterns in the β waves are unique to each individual, making them ideal
for biometric encryption.
B. Feature Extraction
We record a EEG signal (Beta waves) from a specific user
for time period T . The Beta waves are amplified by amplifier
value A and matched via high order Legendre Polynomials,
where Legendre Differential equation is given by:
∂
∂x
[(1− x2) ∂
∂x
pn (x)]+n(n+1)pn(x) = 0. (1)
Legendre polynomials are computed using Rodrigues’s
formula, which is given by:
pn(x) =
1
2nn!
∂ n
∂xn
[(x2−1)n]. (2)
The n-degree equation used for fitting data is given by:
y(x) = a0+
n
∑
1
ai pi(x). (3)
The polynomial coefficients a0,a1, ...an are combined
together with the time window of size T and the am-
plitude multiplier A to form the raw feature vector z :=
{ca0,ca1,ca2, ...can,A,T} where c is a constant to magnify
the difference between coefficients. We map z to w such that
w = z×M+ γ where M is an n×n invertible matrix which
satisfies ∑i mi, j = 1; γ is a random vector whose elements
are within the range
[
2−θ ,2θ
]
.
The polynomial coefficients are combined together with
the time window size T and the amplitude multiplier A to
form the raw feature vector. Since attackers can reconstruct
the original EEG waveform given the feature vector, we
map the feature vector with some random vector using
Linear transformation. This results as a random feature vector
w [11].
C. Randomness Extraction
After obtaining feature vector w, we use a reusable
fuzzy extractor constructed from (n,k)-BCH codes (The
BCH codes form a class of cyclic error-correcting codes
to correct errors occurred [11].) with generator function to
extract enough randomness from it. Randomness provides the
functionality of representing the feature vector in different
form so that attacker cannot reconstruct the original signal.
The randomness extracted from each feature ri is com-
puted as ri = Hx(wi), where Hx is a hash function in a
universal hash family. The universal hash family H is a
class of hash functions. H is defined to be universal if the
possibility of a pair of distinct keys being mapped into the
same index is less than 1/l(l is the length of the randomness
string). The hashing operation is performed after making a
random choice of hash function from the universal class H.
The universal hash function already gives the optimal length
of extracted randomness [11].
We also compute the syndrome Sc of feature values for
future authentication. If the feature element is viewed as
wi(x) = wi0 +wi1x+ ...+win−1x
n−1, every element wi has a
corresponding syndrome Sci for (n,k)-BCH codes:
Sci = wi(x)modg(x) =
{
wi(α1),wi(α2), ...,wi(α2t)
}
. (4)
D. Key Generation
Next, we generate the key based on the features and
pre-program the specific UAV with that key to secure the
communication channel. This is a practical way to ensure
that both the ground control station Xbee and the XBee on-
board UAV obtain exactly the same key for encryption and
decryption. The key K is generated based on chosen extracted
randomness from the previous step [11]. The key generation
technique is given below.
We randomly choose q constants 1≤ j1 ≤ ...≤ jq ≤ n to
pick up several features and produces a permuted feature
vector v :=
{
w j1 , ...,w jq
}
.
The key K generated is based on chosen random extracted
randomness r ji : K := r j1 ||...||r jq , where || denotes concate-
nation.
E. Configuring XBee with the Key Generated
After generating the key using the above procedure we
configure the XBee’s AES encryption key parameter to use
the generated key for communication. For this experiment,
we used the Mindwave sensor and Alienware 15’ with i7
6820 HK processor to create the EEG system. The architec-
ture of the EEG system is described in Figure 1.
We utilized a commercially available UAV to conduct this
experiment. The UAV uses the Pixhawk as its controller and
had ardroid as the CPU which had the XBee connected to in
roder to communicate with the ground control station. The
UAV and the base station were wirelessly connected using
Xbee transmitter and receivers.
After configuring the AES encryption key of the XBee
with the generated encryption key, we tested the commu-
nication of UAV with the Xbee connected to the ground
control station. The AES key configuration ensured secured
communication of the UAV to the ground control station.
However, we have also introduced a scenario where an
attacker is trying to intercept the communication between
the UAV and ground control station for the primary purpose
of controlling the UAV for its own purpose. For simplicity,
we have assumed that the attacker already knows the key
generated and has configured its own device with that key
and to maliciously communicate with the UAV.
Fig. 3. Experimental Setup.
As a safety measure, we have preconfigured the UAV’s
Xbee to receive the commands from the ground control
station Xbee’s address. If the attacker tries to send the control
signals from it’s device then from the attacker’s packet
address we verify that a third party is intervening and we
activate the Return-To-Launch control signal in the UAV.
This would mean that the UAV identified that an attack was
attempted and should return to its starting location. The RTL
(Return-To-Launch mode) aids the UAV navigation from its
current position to hover above the home position. RTL is
a GPS-dependent move, so it is essential that GPS lock is
enabled before attempting to use this mode. The algorithm
is described below as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: RTL mode activation in UAV
getAddress← xbeedata.getAddress()
if getAddress 6= groundcontrolstation.getAdress() then
LockGPS()
ReturnToLaunch()
else
Continue;
end if
The LockGPS() function ensures that the sensor is not
affected by any other way since it becomes completely
independent of the rest of the communication process.
We also propose another methodology where, in case a
hack is attempted, the Xbee sends predefined signal to the
ground control station which signals the station to configure
the XBees (both at the ground control station and at the UAV)
with a new key. We then run at the ground control station
the same pipeline of key generation from the EEG signal and
generate another key to ensure the communication is secure
and configure both the XBees.
We describe the algorithm below (Algorithm 2):
Algorithm 2: Key Change request in UAV
getAddress← xbeedata.getAddress()
if getAddress 6= groundcontrolstation.getAdress() then
LockGPS()
SendKeyChangeToGroundControlStation()
WaitForKey()
else
Continue();
end if
Another attempt to ensure a secure communication is to
regularly change the key generated and configure the Xbees
at regular intervals of time. This way we achieve quite robust
and secure way of communication in the UAVs.
V. RESULTS
In the initial setup we collect the EEG data and activated
our key generation pipeline to generate a key. The data
were collected from a user performing a specific task which
involves activating the Beta component of the EEG signal.
The collected data (around 1000 data points), are fed to the
data to our key generation pipeline that involves Features
extraction, Randomness extraction and Key generation.
Then we configure the XBee’s in AT mode to ensure
that XBee’s AES encryption mode is enabled and uses the
Key generated from our pipeline. Since the EEG data is
inconsistent even for the same user at different time intervals,
the generated Key from our pipeline would be different, thus
ensuring uniqueness of the Key generated. This enables users
to configure the XBee’s AES key to different values. This
setup is shown in Figure 3.
A normal EEG waveform of a single person is shown in
Figure 4: We extract the Beta components of different people
which was collected under similar tasks. It is shown in Figure
4.
Xbee has 2 basic modes of interaction: AT and AP2 mode.
AT mode is also referred as “Transparent” mode. In AT
mode, any data sent to the XBee module is immediately sent
to the remote module identified by the Destination Address
in memory. When the module is in AT mode, it can be con-
figured by the user or a host microcontroller by first placing
the module in Command mode and then sending predefined
AT commands through the UART port. This mode is useful
when you don’t need to change destination addresses very
often, or you have a very simple network, or simple point to
point communication Since Xbee’s can be configured only
in AT mode we had to stop the ongoing communication
operation which was going on in AP2 mode. In AT mode
no communication takes place so even a potential attack
would fail to communicate. Xbee’s inbuild encryption also
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Fig. 4. Sample EEG waveform(with all the components) of a user
performing a specific mental task.
Fig. 5. Waypoints set for the experiment in the first configuration. The
attack was discovered after the UAV navigated from waypoint 3 and Return-
to-Launch (RTL) was enabled.
gets disabled in AT mode, so it is important to give proper
attention while configuring XBee’s.
We performed our proposed safety mechanism using an
assembled quadcopter with an onboard autopilot and the
Xbee’s to communicate with ground control station. We
set up the waypoints for the UAV using mission planner
software. For our experiment we set up different waypoints
at different configurations and tested our methods at different
times. It is shown from Figure 5 to Figure 6.
The purpose was to travel these way-points and return to
the base location in case an attack is detected. We introduced
a third party attacking mechanism, and for simplistic purpose
we made the third party aware of the key generated which the
UAV’s Xbee is using to communicate with the ground control
station. As the third party starts attacking and maliciously
Fig. 6. Waypoints set for the experiment in the second configuration.
The attack was discovered after the UAV navigated from waypoint 5 and
Return-to-Launch (RTL) was enabled.
sending control signals to the UAV, our algorithm success-
fully detects the intervention (since the received packets
at the UAV’s XBee has different source address). After
detection of the intervention, the UAV initiates its RTL
mechanism and return to the base GPS location without
completing the directed trajectory.
We tested our other approach of changing the key when
an attack is detected. During this test we setup the same
waypoints and introduced a similar type of attack along
the way. After successful detection of the intervention, the
algorithm sent a key change request to the ground control
station, during which, the UAV’s communication is restricted
to the ground control station and it hovers at a specified
location where the attack was attempted. After the Xbee is
configured to a new AES key, the navigation is resumed to
the destined location.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have provided an approach for biometric encryption
of a UAV communicating with the ground control station.
We have also provided a safety mechanism for the UAV
in case a third-party intervention is detected along the way.
This approach can be used for any UAV scenario where
cyberattacks are a particular concern. Our approach not only
adds a layer of additional security to the UAV but also
provides a unique way for securing the UAV with low-cost
resources.
In the future work, we plan to further extend our authen-
tication scheme to multi-UAV scenarios [13], [14], where
a cluster of UAVs aim to authenticate their controller. A
possible approach is to have each member in the all UAVs (a
cluster) sequentially verify the controller one by one utilizing
the proposed authentication scheme. Formation control and
cooperative learning in multi-robot systems can be utilized
to enhance the safety security mechanism [15], [16].
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